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The United States Supreme Court long has recognized that the in-
come of a business operating in interstate commerce is not immune to
fairly apportioned state taxation.1 The Supreme Court has established,
however, that jurisdictional boundaries limit state power to impose a tax
on such income.2 A state cannot give its income tax extraterritorial ef-
fect.' The Supreme Court recently considered the limits of state taxing
power regarding nondomiciliary multinational and multistate corpora-
tions.' The Court addressed the issue whether the due process clause' or
commerce clause6 of the United States Constitution prevents state ap-
portionment of the consolidated income of a corporate taxpayer when
the taxpayer performs only limited operations within the state.7 In a
' See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458-63
(1959) (net income of nondomiciliary corporation generated by interstate activities held ap-
portionable when taxing state demonstrated sufficient connection to income); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920) (tax upon net profits valid although
on profits derived mainly from interstate commerce); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak
Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1918) (nondiscriminatory tax on net profits held not violative of
commerce clause).
' Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). See generally Rudolph, State Taxation of
Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25
TAX L. REv. 171 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rudolph]. A state may tax only income arising
from sources within the state. Rudolph, supra, at 181. The controlling question is whether
the state has provided anything to the corporation for which the state then can assess a tax
in return. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); see infra note 7 (carrying
on business within state provided state opportunity to tax business).
Rudolph, supra note 2, at 181.
See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957 (U.S.
June 29, 1982); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962 (U.S. June 29,
1982). See generally P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 235-45 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as HARTMAN].
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides in part that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Id.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article one, section eight of the United States Constitution
provides in part that Congress shall have the power to regulate interstate commerce. Id.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 210 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 427 (1980). A state may impose taxes on cor-
porations as a pecuniary charge for the protection and services the state affords corpora-
tions. Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal. App. 2d 48, 81, 156 P.2d 81, 95, 99 (1945). The
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires both a minimal connection be-
tween the interstate activities and the taxing state and a rational relationship between the
income attributed to the state and the local corporate activity for a state to tax income
generated in interstate commerce. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978);
see Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1968) (state tax
assessment on railroad's rolling stock held invalid because tax projected state's power
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series of decisions, the Court concluded that when a corporate taxpayer
operates a unitary business,8 a state may tax the total net corporate in-
come reasonably related to the activities conducted within the taxing
state.9
The Supreme Court has not decided that one method of state taxa-
tion is preferable over another. 10 State taxation statutes consequently
vary from state to state." As a result of the varied state tax schemes,
corporations operating in more than one state may be subjected to
beyond borders). Carrying on business within the state provides the requisite minimal con-
nection. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940); General Motors Corp. v.
State, 181 Colo. 360, 368, 509 P.2d 1260, 1264 (1973). State taxation meets the rational rela-
tionship requirement if the state seeks to tax only corporation profits earned within the
state. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 119-20 (1920); see Hans
Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931) (state tax for-
mula attributing disporportionate amount of corporate income to state held unconstitu-
tional).
A state tax that reaches income generated outside the state, however, does not destroy
the minimum connection between the tax and the transactions within the state for which
the tax is an exaction. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940); Qualls v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 266 Ark. 207, 228, 585 S.W.2d 18, 30 (1979). For example, a state may
tax its citizens upon income received from property situated in another state on the theory
that domicile itself affords a basis for income tax. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S.
308, 312-16 (1937). The commerce clause prohibits discriminatory taxation of interstate com-
merce. Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435
U.S. 734, 750 (1978); Quails v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 266 Ark. 207, 226-27, 585 S.W.2d 18,
28-29 (1979). Subjecting an interstate business to duplicative taxation that an intrastate tax-
payer would not be subjected to, however, violates the commerce clause. General Motors
Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 449 (1964). But see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Min-
nesota, 322 U.S. 292, 295 (1944) (state tax on all property used in intrastate commerce held
valid despite taxability of same property in other states). Alternatively, exacting more than
the state's proportionate share from the interstate business violates the commerce clause.
Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734,
747-48 (1978); see Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 499, 502 (1904) (state tax formula held un-
constitutional because formula did not reflect true value of corporate worth within taxing
state).
See infra notes 24-25 (definition of unitary business).
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957, 4961 (U.S.
June 29, 1982); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4968 (U.S. June
29, 1982); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439-40 (1980); see infra text accompanying
notes 37-98 (discussion of Woolworth, ASARCO, Exxon, and Mobil cases).
"0 See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-79 (1978) (United States Constitu-
tion does not favor one form of state taxation over another); General Motors Corp. v.
District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965) (Supreme Court refrained from defining single
appropropriate method of state taxation).
" Comment, State Taxation of Foreign Source Corporate Dividends: Another Con-
quest of the Expanded Unitary Business Doctrine, 22 URB. L. ANN. 229, 229-30 (1981); see
H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 119 (1964) (discussion of various state apportion-
ment plans). See generally CONTROLLERSHIP FOUNDATION: APPORTIONMENT AND ALLOCATION
FORMULAE AND FACTORS USED BY STATES IN LEVYING TAXES BASED ON OR MEASURED BY NET
INCOME OF MANUFACTURING, DISTRIBUTIVE AND EXTRACTIVE CORPORATIONS (1954).
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either overtaxation or undertaxation. 12 Congress has the power to
regulate state taxation regarding interstate commerce" and currently is
seeking to establish some uniformity in state taxation of multistate and
multinational corporations."' Additionally, state tax administrators have
combined to form the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC)15 and have drafted
the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)16 to
achieve some uniformity in state taxation. Until Congress or the states
promulgate effective and binding regulations, however, corporate tax-
payers remain open to inconsistent state taxation of corporate income."
State income taxation of multinational and multistate corporations
requires a determination of the amount of corporate income that
2 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. State, 181 Colo. 360, -, 509 P.2d 1260, 1266
(1973) (overlapping state taxation of nondomiciliary corporation and lack of uniformity in
state tax plans do not present any constitutional problems); J.G. McCrory Co. v. Commis-
sioners of Corps. & Tax'n, 280 Mass. 273, -, 182 N.E. 481, 484 (1932) (held no statutory
basis for excise tax on nondomiciliary corporation doing business within taxing state).
13 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978).
" See infra text accompanying notes 127-33 (discussion of recent congressional action
regarding uniformity in state taxation).
"5 See Killefer, State Taxation of Commerce: Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner
of Taxes of Vermont, 8 J. CORP. TAX'N 3, 8 (1981) [hereinafter cited Killefer]. In 1966, the Na-
tional Association of Tax Administrators attempted to resolve the problem regarding taxa-
tion of multistate corporations by forming the Multistate Tax Commission and drafting the
Multistate Tax Compact. Id. The purposes of the Multistate Tax Compact are to facilitate
the proper determination of tax liability of multistate taxpayers, achieve uniformity among
state tax systems, facilitate taxpayer compliance in filing returns, and avoid duplicative tax-
ation. Id. The Multistate Tax Commission administers the Multistate Tax Compact. Id.
" See Killefer, supra note 15, at 8. In 1967, the Multistate Tax Commission adopted
the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), the model act for state ap-
portionment of income. Id.; UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, 7A U.L.A.
91, 93-108 (1978). UDITPA classified corporate income as either business or nonbusiness in-
come. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, §§ 1(a), 4, 7A U.L.A. 93, 97
(1978). Business income includes income from tangible and intangible property acquired,
managed, or disposed of in integral or necessary parts of the taxpayer's trade or business
operations. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT, § 1(a), 7A U.L.A. 93 (1978).
UDITPA required apportionment of business income. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX
PURPOSES ACT, § 9, 7A U.L.A. 100 (1978). Nonbusiness income represents remaining non-
qualifying corporate income that states cannot apportion. Id. § 1(e), 7A U.L.A. at 94 (non-
business income includes all income other than business income). UDITPA required specific
allocation of nonbusiness income. Id. § 4, 7A U.L.A. at 97. UDITPA attempts to ensure that
100% of a corporation's income is available for taxation by the states in which a corporation
operates. See generally Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act. Reflections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the "Throwback"
Rule, 45 U. CHL L. REV. 768, 768-771 (1978).
"7 Compare Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 417,_, 34 Cal. Rptr.
552, 555-56, 386 P.2d 40, 43-44 (1963) (nonintegrated multistate petroleum corporation held
entitled to apportion income rather than use specific accounting to determine state tax)
with Webb Resources, Inc. v. McCoy, 194 Kan. 758, -, 401 P.2d 879, 889-91 (1965)
(nonintegrated multistate petroleum corporation held not entitled to apportion income, in-
stead must allocate income to determine state tax).
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reasonably relates to sources or activities within the taxing state.18 State
taxing commissions utilize three basic approaches to determine cor-
porate taxable income.19 First, under the separate accounting method,
corporations must allocate income for tax purposes to the same
geographic or functional divisions that the corporation uses for other
financial and accounting purposes."0 Second, the specific allocation
method requires the corporation to allocate certain items of income to a
specific legal or business situs.21 Third, under the apportionment method
,8 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); see G. ALTMAN & F. KEES-
LING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 28-31 (1946) [hereinafter cited as ALTMAN &
KEESLING].
19 J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 310-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
HELLERSTEIN]; Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of
Multistate-Multinational Businesses, 10 URB. LAW. 181, 181 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Dexter].
" HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 310. State taxing authorities permit separate account-
ing when the taxing authorities accurately can separate a corporation's income producing
activity and income sources within the state from the corporation's income producing ac-
tivities and income sources outside the state. Dexter, supra note 19, at 181. States utilize
two major methods of separate accounting. Under the management profit method, the cor-
poration adds a fixed percentage to the cost of goods after each stage of the operations
necessary to produce and sell the goods. ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 18, at 90. Under
the fair market value approach, states recognize intracorporate transactions at the fair
market value of the goods transferred, regardless of the actual costs involved. Id. at 91. The
fair market value minus cost represents profit on intracorporate transactions. Id. at 91-92.
Separate accounting cannot account for the interrelationship between departments since in-
tracompany transactions are priced hypothetically. Id. at 38; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at
310. Income figures from one company department consequently fail to reflect the contribu-
tions from other company departments and inaccurate profit figures result. See ALTMAN &
KEESLING, supra note 18, at 38; HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 310; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980) (separate accounting useful for internal auditing
but fails to isolate accurately portions of income produced in various states).
" Dexter, supra note 19, at 181. Specific allocation generally applies to properties and
income not associated with the taxpayer's overall business operations. Id. For example, the
property tax situs of an ocean-going vessel is the legal domicile of the owner. Southern Pac.
Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 71, 76-77 (1911) (steamships owned by Kentucky corporation
and used for coastal trade taxable by Kentucky). Specific allocation assigns income to a par-
ticular jurisdiction for tax purposes only. Roger Dean Enters. v. State Department of
Revenue, 387 So. 2d 358, 361 (Fla. 1980). The state of incorporation represents the
company's legal domicile, while the principal place of business represents the company's
commercial domicile. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 208-12 (1936) (intangible
property belonging to company taxable in state of commercial domicile).
The taxation situs concept stems from the ancient idea that the government of the tax-
payer's domicile protected the property of the taxpayer. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222
U.S. 63, 68 (1911). Courts have recognized that states may tax income from intangible prop-
erty at the commercial situs of the property owner if the corporation uses the property
directly in the transaction of business. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234,
237 (1937); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 208, 211-12 (1936). Thus, the state of
commercial domicile may tax income from intangible property because the state provides
protection and benefits to the corporations. Chestnut Sec. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
125 F.2d 571, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (1942). The only benefit the
legal domicile often offers the taxpayer is technical, as in the case of incorporation. Id. The
[Vol 40:191
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the taxing state utilizes a formula to determine the corporate net income
attributable to the sources and activities within the taxing state." States
may use any one or a combination of these methods, but controversy ex-
ists regarding the applicability of each.' The threshold question in deter-
mining which method to use is whether the corporation being taxed
operates as a unitary business.
nature of intangible property, however, permits more than one tax situs. Curry v. Mc-
Canless, 307 U.S. 357, 367 (1939) (intangible property not necessarily ascribed to one situs,
therefore intangible property utilized in several states taxable in the several states); Cream
of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, 330 (1920) (intangible property differs
from tangible property because intangible property may have multiple tax situs). Income
from intangible property conceivably can be taxed in as many as four states. Keesling &
Warren, California's Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
Rlv. 156, 157 (1967). The state of incorporation, state of commercial domicile, state in which
the property has been pledged as security, and in the case of dividends, the state of domicile
of the declaring corporation conceivably may all tax income from intangible property. Id. In
the case of property having several tax situs, the Constitution does not prohibit taxation by
the several states. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 372-73 (1939) (each of two states con-
stitutionally may impose tax on testamentary transfer of intangible property); Cream of
Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, 329 (1920) (intangible property acquiring
business situs outside state of owner's domicile held taxable by state of legal domicile).
I Dexter, supra note 19, at 181. States prefer income tax apportionment over separate
accounting or specific allocation in instances when states cannot separate accurately income
producing activities and sources within the state from income producing activities and
sources outside the state. Id. Under the apportionment theory of taxation, corporate net in-
come derives from individual states in proportion to corporate activities within each state,
and the individual states tax the entire corporate net income accordingly. ALTMAN & KEES-
LING, supra note 18, at 28. Taxation by apportionment utilizes a mathematical formula
weighing various economic factors related to producing net income and using a ratio com-
paring business operations within the taxing state to the entire corporate operations. Id. at
97. One formula compares the proportion of a taxpayer's real and intangible personal prop-
erty located within the taxing state to the taxpayer's total real and intangible personal prop-
erty. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 119 (1920). Most states' for-
mulas compare intrastate tangible property, payroll, and gross sales with total amounts for
these three factors. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 309; Lynn, Formula Apportionment of
Corporate Income for State Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 84, 89
(1957). The taxing state typically computes ratios for the three factors comparing intrastate
to out-of-state operations and then averages the ratios in order to determine the measure of
the tax to the state. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 309; see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2063
(1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-4-10 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833 (1981). In some in-
stances, states substitute manufacturing costs for the payroll factor. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 19, at 309; see General Motors Corp. v. District of Columiba, 308 U.S. 553, 559 n.9
(1965) (Court recognized that payroll factor sometimes replaced by manufacturing costs
factor). The United States Constitution requires only that the state formula used produce
reasonable and rational results. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 506-10 (1942).
1 See Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931) (apportionment
formula unconstitutional if formula attributed disproportionate share of corporate income to
intrastate business); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 499 (1904) (same); see Keesling & Warren,
The Unitary Concept In the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42, 43-45 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Keesling & Warren].
I Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 479-80, 183 P.2d 16, 20-21 (1947).
Several courts have held that when a number of business operations have common owner-
1983]
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Finding a unitary business25 permits state apportionment of cor-
porate net income. 6 Once the taxpayer or staten establishes that the
business is a unitary business, the primary state concern becomes the
amount of the corporate income that the state should include in the tax-
payer's tax base.' The tax base consists of all income produced by the
ship, benefit one another, depend on each other, and contribute to each other, the business
operations constitute a single unitary business. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner
of Revenue, 378 Mass. 577, 585-86, 393 N.E.2d 330, 335 (1979); Montana Dep't of Revenue v.
American Smelting and Ref. Co., 173 Mont. 316, -, 567 P.2d 901, 908 (1977). Unitary
businesses operate with a high degree of interrelationship and interdependence among af-
filiated corporations, subsidiaries, and divisions. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 Ill.
2d 102, 108, 417 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (1981). The integrated relationship creates problems in
determining accurately the amount of taxable income generated within a state. Id. In tax
situations involving a unitary business, states prefer the apportionment method of taxation
over separate accounting or specific allocation. See Id. at 115-16, 417 N.E.2d at 1350-53. Ap-
portionment of unitary income results in attributing income to each of several states in
which the unitary business operates. ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 18, at 90, 107.
Separate accounting or specific allocation often results in corporate losses in several states
where the unitary business operates. People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 N.Y.
114, -, 155 N.E. 68, 70-71 (1926). Thus, these two methods of taxation may produce
misleading results in taxation of unitary businesses. Id.; see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-
sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980); Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d
472, 480-81, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (1947). See generally Dexter, supra note 19, at 198-204; Lavelle,
What Constitutes a Unitary Business, 25 S. CAL. T. INST. 239 (1973).
2' The Supreme Court recognized the unitary business principle over sixty years ago.
ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4965 n.14 (U.S. June 29, 1982);
see Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 282 (1924) (company
operating manufacturing, distributing, and selling divisions held unitary business); Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920) (same). When a business
makes a series of intracorporate transactions, and profits accrue only with final sales, a
state may tax a just proportion of net profits for the privilege of doing business within the
state. Bass, 266 U.S. at 280. A similar concept called the "unit rule" preceded the unitary
business principle. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891). The
unit rule represented a property tax by which a state treated an entire railroad system as a
taxable unit and distributed the assessed value of the unit according to the ratio of rail
located in the taxing state to the whole length of the railway system. Id.; see also State R.R.
Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 601 (1876).
2 See Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 336 (1939) (taxation of unitary
enterprise necessitated apportionment since value of property in taxing state was increased
when used in connection with corporation's property outside taxing state); Wallace v. Hines,
253 U.S. 66, 69 (1920) (apportionment necessary if business taxed utilized property outside
taxing state which added to value of property within taxing state).
2 State authorities insist on apportionment of unitary taxpayers operating within
their state in order to determine reasonably the amount of tax that the taxpayer owes the
state. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-74 (1978); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452, 464-65 (1959). Sometimes, however, a
corporate taxpayer argues in favor of apportionment. See Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 408, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546, 386 P.2d 33, 34 (1963) (taxpayer asserted
unitary operations resulted in lower tax base); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d
102, 109, 417 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (1981) (same).
218 See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, 358-60, 71
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unitary business.' Courts apply several judicially developed tests0 and
interpret state taxing statutes 1 to determine which parts of a business
operation are within the unitary business. Generally, if operation of the
business within the taxing state is dependent upon or contributes to
operation of the business outside the state, then the business outside the
state is part of the unitary business." More specifically, when corpora-
tions cannot characterize fairly the income of the business as having a
single identifiable geographic or functional source," courts include the
business income in the unitary business. Because state taxation of
multistate corporations lacks both a uniform test and uniform statute,
N.W.2d 797, 804-05 (1955) (state found retail operations part of unitary business including
wholesale distribution of auto parts); Coca Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, 271 Or. 517,
525-26, 533 P.2d 788, 792 (1975) (bottling operations held part of syrup-producing operations
in unitary soft drink business). But see Commonwealth v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 336
Pa. 209, -, 8 A.2d 404, 412-13 (1939) (income from holding company operations excluded
from corporation's taxable net income because corporation did not engage in holding com-
pany activities within taxing state).
" See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, 361, 71
N.W.2d 797, 804-05 (1955) (tax base includes income from both retail and wholesale opera-
tions); Coca Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, 71 Or. 517, 529, 533 P.2d 788, 792 (1975) (tax
base includes income from both bottling and syrup-producing operations).
11 See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942) (unitary business deter-
mined by unity of ownership, operations, and use); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, 357, 71 N.W.2d 797, 804-05 (1955) (unitary business indicated
by mutual contribution and mutual benefits regarding interdivisional relations). Com-
monwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, 243, 38 A.2d 329, 334-35 (1944) (unitary business
determined by necessity and connection of corporate divisions to each other).
31 Xerox Corp. v. Comptroller, 290 Md. 126, 129-30, 428 A.2d 1208, 1211 (1981) (inter-
preting MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c) (1980)); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner, 378
Mass. 577, 585-86, 393 N.E.2d 330, 335 (1979) (interpreting MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 63,
§ 38 (West 1969)).
1, Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 272 Minn. 403, -, 138
N.W.2d 612, 616-19 (1965), appeal denied, 384 U.S. 718 (1966); cf. Logan Clay Prods. Co. v.
Commonwealth Bd. of Fin. & Revenue, 11 Pa. Commw. 629, -, 315 A.2d 346, 354 (1974)
(entire net income generated by corporation's multistate operations not included in formula
computation used in determining state tax owed because corporation operated independent
and noncontributory businesses). See generally ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 18, at 101.
The test of a unitary business is whether or not the operation of the portion of the business
within the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the business outside
the state. Id. (giving examples); see also Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Ap-
portionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487, 488-92
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
I See Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1980) (taxpayer
argued functional source of income limited taxation of income to states where income arose).
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (taxpayer argued that
geographic source of income limited taxation of income to states where income arose).
", Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp.
y. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980); see HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 400
(income from unitary business impossible to allocate wholly to one step in the economic pro-
cess).
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the results reached by different courts are not consistent. 5 Moreover,
the decisions are often vague and arbitrary. 6
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,"7 the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of the Vermont Commissioner of Taxes'
inclusion in Mobil's tax base of dividends earned from foreign-source in-
vestments under the unitary business concept.' The Court held that
neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause precluded Ver-
mont's inclusion of foreign-source dividends in Mobil's apportionable tax
base. 9 The Court reasoned that a vertically integrated company0 such
" Dexter, supra note 19, at 193; see Recent Developments, supra note 32, at 497-503
(analysis of decisions regarding unitary business concept). Compare Superior Oil Co. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 412-13, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 551, 386 P.2d 33, 39 (1963)
(nonintegrated oil company held to operate one unitary business) with Skelly Oil Co. v. Com-
missioner of Tax'n, 269 Minn. 351, 369, 131 N.W.2d 632, 643 (1964) (integrated oil company
held to operate two distinct unitary businesses which were production company and
marketing company).
' ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4967 n.22 (U.S. June
29, 1982). Compare People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 N.Y. 114, __, 155
N.E. 68, 70-71 (1926) (subsidiary of parent automobile company held distinct from unitary
operations of parent) with Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, __ , 38 A.2d
329, 333 (1944) (operating divisions of automobile company held not separate from parent
company). See generally TAx FOUNDATION, INC., "Taxation of Interstate Business" (1979
TAX FOUNDATION SEMINAR) [hereinafter cited as TAx FOUNDATION SEMINAR]. The language
of the several tests determining the extent of a unitary business tends to find a unitary
business in almost any large multistate and multinational business. See Id. at 75-78.
" 445 U.S. 425 (1980). In Mobil, Vermont imposed a corporate income tax, calculated
by means of an apportionment formula, upon dividend income received by Mobil from its af-
filiates doing business abroad. Id. at 429-32. Mobil incorporated in New York and had its
principal place of business in New York. Id. at 427. In Vermont, Mobil engaged soley in the
wholesale and retail marketing of petroleum products. Id. at 428. Mobil contended that Ver-
mont's apportionment scheme taxed income earned outside Vermont's jurisdiction, but the
Vermont Supreme Court ultimately upheld the tax. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 136 Vt. 545, 394 A.2d 1147 (1978), affd, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
Id. at 437-49. The Mobil Court noted that Mobil's election to attack Vermont's
assessment of Mobil's tax base rather than Vermont's apportionment formula substantially
narrowed the issues presented. Id. at 434. Justice Stevens objected to the Court's treat-
ment of Mobil's arguments. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying
notes 46-50 (discussion of dissent).
" Id. at 427. Mobil argued that Vermont could not tax Mobil's foreign-source dividends
because no minimum connection existed between the business activities of Mobil's foreign
affiliate corporations and Vermont. Id. at 437-42. Mobil additionally argued that the Ver-
mont tax plan subjected the corporation to double taxation because the dividends were
wholly taxable in New York, Mobil's legal domicile. Id. at 442-46; see supra notes 5-7
(general discussion of due process clause and commerce clause arguments).
4 GREENWALD, DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 623 (2d ed. 1973). Vertical integra-
tion requires operation of a single business at more than one stage of production or distribu-
tion. Id. The most comprehensive type of vertical integration includes productive stages
from the acquisition of raw material to the completion and distribution of the finished pro-
duct. Id. A single company organized vertically often can carry out an entire production pro-
cess more efficiently than a number of individual firms. Id. The company brings together
complimentary processes and coordinates various production stages resulting in increased
efficiency and economies of scale. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236,
242-45, 38 A.2d 329, 31-33 (1944) (discussion of vertical integration).
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as Mobil produces a unitary stream of income, no portion of which is
capable of segregation or attributable to one activity.41 The integrated
relationship between divisions makes impossible the accurate deter-
mination of the amount of taxable net income generated within a state.42
The fact that Mobil's affiliated corporations were legally separate en-
tities did not change the underlying economic realities of Mobil's unitary
business operation.4 3 The Court concluded that Mobil failed to establish
that the corporation's dividend earning activities were unrelated to
Mobil's sale of petroleum products in Vermont.
44
The Mobil majority assumed that the dividends in issue would repre-
sent the income of the operating divisions of Mobil if Mobil and its af-
filiates comprised a single integrated enterprise. 45 Justice Stevens ob-
jected to the majority's broad definition of unitary businesses on three
grounds. 6 First, many of the businesses that the majority included in
Mobil's unitary business paid only dividends to Mobil and were neither
engaged in the petroleum business nor had any connection with Mobil's
marketing business in Vermont. Second, Mobil had no control over the
percentage of earnings paid out in dividends of corporations in which
Mobil only had a minority interest.48 Finally, Vermont failed to incor-
" 445 U.S. at 440-41. But see Rudolph, supra note 2, at 185 (states may allocate intangi-
ble income to corporation's commercial domicile); Keesling & Warren, supra note 23, at
52-57 (investment income not necessarily attributable to general operations and consequently
not apportionable).
4 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); HELLER-
STEIN, supra note 19, at 400.
445 U.S. at 440-41.
" Id. at 441-42.
'5 Id. at 440-41.
" Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens accepted in theory the majority's
definition of a unitary business. Id. at 459-60. Justice Stevens objected, however, to the
majority's definition as applied to the Mobil facts. Id.
1, Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens objected to Vermont's treatment
of Mobirs dividend income from corporations in which Mobil retained small minority in-
terests and which were unrelated to Mobil's unitary business. Id.; see id. at 456 n.9 (listing
of corporations whose dividends were included in Mobil's tax base). The majority failed to
address the tax base issue, reasoning that Mobil failed to attack the reasonableness of Ver-
mont's assessment of Mobil's net taxable income. 445 U.S. at 434 (majority opinion). The tax
base portion of the Mobil opinion resulted more from a failure of proof than from a constitu-
tional ruling. See id. Mobil offered no evidence contradicting the conclusion that most, if not
all, of its subsidiaries and affiliates contributed to Mobil's worldwide petroleum enterprise.
Id. at 435. The majority pointed out that the dissent raised de novo the issue of Vermont's
inclusion of all of Mobil's dividend income in Mobil's tax base. Id. at 434 n.11; cf. Chase Brass
& Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, __ ,95 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (1970)
(holding income from several sister subsidiary corporations not includable in taxpayer's tax
base because sister subsidiaries lacked relationship with taxpayer), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
961 (1970). But cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal. App. 2d 48, -, 156 P.2d 81,
92-93 (1945) (corporate taxpayer taxed on dividends received from corporations less than
one percent owned by taxpayer and unrelated to general business of taxpayer).
I Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dividends issue in Mobil illustrates one prob-
lem involved in defining a unitary business, but Mobil failed to raise the dividends issue. 445
U.S. at 434-36 (majority opinion); see supra note 38. Compare Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commis-
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porate any of the apportionment factors of the payor corporations into
the apportionment formula applied to Mobil's tax base. 9 The majority
avoided these three issues because Mobil waived any objections to the
mechanics of the Vermont apportionment formula."
The Court reaffirmed Mobil in Exxon Corp. v. Department of
Revenue, which presented to the Court the constitutionality of Wiscon-
sin's inclusion in Exxon's tax base of corporate income derived from oil
and gas extracted from Wisconsin under the unitary business concept. 1
As in Mobil, the Court rejected Exxon's due process and commerce
clause attacks.2 The Court held that Exxon's marketing and extraction
activities were both part of Exxon's unitary petroleum business.'
Though the company accounted for each department as a separate cor-
poration, Exxon operated a highly integrated business that benefitted
from centralized management and controlled interaction between
sioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 449 (1980) (all dividend income included in tax base of unitary
business) with ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4968 (U.S. June
29, 1982) (dividends unrelated to taxpayer's unitary business excluded from tax base).
,' Id. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that Vermont
overstated the tax base and applied its apportionment formula in an arbitrary and un-
constitutional way. Id. The majority pointed out, however, that Mobil failed to present this
argument to the lower court and consequently refused to rule on the issue. Id. at 441 n.15
(majority opinion). Inclusion of all the subsidiaries' and affiliates' sales, payroll, and prop-
erty in the calculation of Vermont's apportionment formula would result in decreased net
taxes for Mobil since the numerator would remain the same and the denominator substan-
tially increases, for a net result of a diminished apportionment fraction. Id. But see Com-
monwealth v. Ford Motor Co., 350 Pa. 236, -, 38 A.2d 329, 334 (1944) (statutory formula
included in multiplicand book value of stock of wholly-owned subsidiaries without including
in denominators of allocative fractions tangible property, wages, and gross receipts of sub-
sidiaries).
' See supra notes 41-43. If Mobil had raised the issue of inclusion of dividend receipts
from domestic corporations in the tax base, the Court probably would have decided the
issue according to its later reasoning in the Woolworth case. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957, 4959-61 (U.S. June 29, 1982) (income from
business unrelated to unitary operations of taxpayer held not part of apportionable income).
Alternatively, the Court might have applied the reasoning in the Hans Rees' Sons case. See
Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 134 (1931) (apportionment formula
reaching profits in no way attributable to transactions within taxing jurisdiction held un-
constitutional).
"I 447 U.S. 207 (1980). Exxon marketed but did not refine or extract petroleum in
Wisconsin. Id. at 213. Wisconsin sought to tax income derived from the out-of-state extrac-
tion of oil and gas that Exxon then transferred to its out-of-state refineries. Id. at 214-15.
Exxon maintained its principal place of business in Texas and incorporated in New York. Id.
at 210. Exxon contended that its exploration and production department, refining depart-
ment, and marketing department constituted separate businesses and that Wisconsin could
tax only income produced from the marketing operations. Id. at 215. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the marketing operations were part of a single unitary petroleum
business conducted by Exxon. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700,
-, 281 N.W.2d 94, __ (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
447 U.S. at 210, 226-27, 229-30.
Id. at 225-30. The Court held that Exxon's out-of-state activities passed both the suf-
ficient connection test and rational relation text required by the due process clause. Id. at
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departments.- Exxon argued that the income derived from exploration
and production must be treated as situs income and allocated to the situs
state rather than apportioned by Wisconsin." The Court ruled that the
location of raw materials did not alter the fact that income derived from
the sale of raw materials represented part of Exxon's unitary business
income."
In addressing both Mobil's and Exxon's claims, the Supreme Court
focused on the integration and interdependence of the parties' affiliated
corporations and functional divisions. 7 In Exxon and Mobil, the Court
held that if income from subsidiaries, affiliates, or separate divisions
reflected profits derived from a functionally integrated enterprise, then
that income represented income to the parent corporation earned in part
of the parent's unitary business. The Court considered several factors
in Exxon's operations as illustrative of a unitary business. These factors
226-27; see supra notes 5 & 7 (discussion of due process requirement). The Court also noted
that the risk of double taxation is not violative of the commerce clause. 447 U.S. at 228. Dou-
ble taxation of interstate commerce violates the commerce clause when intrastate com-
merce is not subjected to the same taxation. See Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560, 562 (1975); Western Live Stock Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 256 (1938). Exxon contended that the commerce clause requires allocation of income
derived from exploration and production to the situs state. 447 U.S. at 227. The Exxon
Court refused to accept Exxon's allocation argument and held that Exxon operated a
unitary business subject to apportionment of unitary income. Id. at 228.
A state tax violates the commerce clause when the tax unfairly burdens commerce by
exacting from the interstate activity more than the activity's share of the cost of state govern-
ment. See Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435
U.S. 734, 747-48 (1978). The Exxon Court held that Wisconsin's taxation of Exxon's unitary
income did not violate the commerce clause because Exxon failed to prove actual multiple
taxation. 447 U.S. at 228. The Exxon Court took notice of the practical effect of the tax,
which taxed income bearing a relation to the benefits and privileges conferred by Wisconsin
to Exxon. Id. at 228-29; see Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedor-
ing Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 746-47 (1978) (general business tax levied only on value of ser-
vices performed within taxing state held properly apportioned and could not result in multi-
ple burdens on interstate commerce); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
288-89 (1977) (practical economic effect on tax determinative of validity under commerce
clause); Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 93 (1972) (per curiam) (holding invalid unapportioned tax
levied on gross receipts derived from activities in interstate commerce since taxpayer was
exposed to duplicative taxation to which intrastate business was not exposed); Gwin, White
& Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 436-39 (1939) (same).
Exxon, 447 U.S. at 224.
Id. at 224-25 (discussion of interrelationship of Exxon's three functional depart-
ments). Exxon's Coordination and Services Management provided many essential corporate
services for the entire company, including the coordination of the refining and other opera-
tional functions to obtain an optimum short range operating program. Id.
m Id. at 228-29. The commerce clause does not require allocation of taxable income
when a taxpayer uses accounting methods to separate such income geographically or func-
tionally. Id. at 229-30.
51 Id. at 224-26; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438-41.
Exxon, 447 U.S. at 222-23; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 440.
5' Exxon, 447 U.S. at 224-25. Factors not considered by the Exxon Court but con-
sidered by other courts as indicative of a unitary business include interlocking director-
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included centralized ownership, centralized administration, centralized
purchasing, centralized marketing, and controlled interaction and in-
tegration of functional departments.0 The Court reasoned that these
five factors operated to obscure fair allocation of income between
Exxon's several divisions. 1 The Court stated that provided a tax assess-
ed by a state bears a rational relation to the protections, opportunities,
and benefits given by the state to the corporation, unitary taxation does
not violate the constitutional rights of the corporation.2 The Exxon
Court sanctioned state apportionment of a corporation's unitary income,
regardless of the source or form of the income.'
Guided by the principles set out in Mobil and Exxon," the Court held
that states could not include certain corporate income in the unitary
businesses of the taxpayers in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and
Revenue Department6 5 and ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commis-
sion.6 In its Mobil decision, the Court expressly kept open the possibility
ships, intracompany sales, and centralized insurance, legal, and financial services. See Mon-
tana Dep't of Revenue v. American Smelting and Ref. Co., 173 Mont. 316, -, 567 P.2d 901,
908 (1977); Zale-Salem, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 237 Or. 261,-, 391 P.2d 601, 602 (1964).
Additionally, courts include income generated from intangible property employed in the
corporation's general activities and commingled with the corporation's unitary income. See
Corning Glass Works v. Department of Revenue, 616 S.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 276 Minn. 479, __ , 151 N.W.2d 294,
296 (1967).
' 447 U.S. at 213, 224. Additionally, the Exxon Court considered Exxon's uniform pro-
duct packaging, uniform credit card system, and uniform product promotion as illustrative
of Exxon's unitary business. Id. at 224.
"1 Id. at 226; see Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438; cf. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 19, at 400 (appor-
tionment necessary method of taxation for unitary business since alternative method for ac-
curately separating profit in unitary business nonexistent).
62 Exxon, 447 U.S. at 228-29; see Mobil, 445 U.S. at 445-46.
' Exxon, 447 U.S. at 222-23, 229; see Mobil, 445 U.S. at 440.
" See supra text and accompanying notes 57-63 (discussion of Exxon and Mobil). Exxon
and Mobil stressed two principles. First, state income taxation utilizing apportionability of
corporate income depends upon determining the extent of the unitary business. Exxon, 447
U.S. at 223; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439. Second, a state may tax a corporation's foreign-source
dividends if the dividends represent contributions of income of the dividend payors
resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale
of the taxpayer, its subsidiaries, and affiliates. See Exxon, 447 U.S. at 222-25; Mobil, 445
U.S. at 438.
6 50 U.S.L.W. 4957 (U.S. June 29, 1982). In Woolworth, the corporation headquarters
were in New York, but the corporation conducted a large retail operation throughout the
United States. Id. at 4957. The corporation owned three foreign corporations and was the
majority stockholder in a fourth. Id. Each subsidiary operated independently of the others
in four separate foreign countries. Id. Upon auditing Woolworth, the New Mexico Depart-
ment of Taxation included dividends paid by these four subsidiaries in Woolworth's
business income. Id. at 4958. The Department argued that the dividend income received by
Woolworth, therefore, was taxable by apportionment. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court
agreed. See Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 95 N.M. 519, 529, 624 P.2d
28, 38 (1981), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957 (U.S. June 29, 1982).




of excluding from apportionable income dividends received from a
foreign subsidiary."7 The Court stated that when the business activities
of the dividend payor are independent of the activities of the parent cor-
poration in the taxing state, the foreign dividends are not part of the
unitary business income.68 Due process considerations consequently
preclude apportionability of the dividends. 9 The Woolworth and ASAR-
CO cases involved factual situatidns distinguishable from the factual
situations in Mobil and Exxon.7' As a result, Woolworth and ASARCO
succeeded in proving that their dividend paying subsidiaries were not
part of their respective unitary businesses.
71
The main issue in Woolworth was whether foreign-source dividends
paid to a nondomiciliary parent corporation constituted apportionable
unitary income.72 The Court noted that although Woolworth had the
potential to operate its subsidiaries as integrated divisions of a single
unitary business, potential does not determine the apportionability
issue. 13 Woolworth's dividend income derived from unrelated business
activities of subsidiaries, each of which operated as a separate business
enterprise.7 4  The Court stated that Woolworth's retail operation
' 445 U.S. at 441-42. The taxpayer corporation has the burden of proof to establish
that dividend income is not part of the unitary income of the corporation. Id. at 442.
Id. at 442.
I !d.
70 See ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4967 n.22 (U.S. June 29, 1982) (Mobil principles
followed but critical factual differences result in different conclusion in ASARCO); supra
notes 37, 51, & 65; infra note 85 (subsidiaries in ASARCO and Woolworth not part of
unitary operation).
"' See ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4968; Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4961.
72 Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4957. In addition to deciding whether foreign-source
dividends constituted unitary income, the Woolworth Court also decided whether New
Mexico's apportionment formula could include the "gross-up" figure that Woolworth
calculated in its federal tax return to claim a foreign tax credit. Id. Gross-up is an accounting
device by which a domestic corporation may credit against its federal income tax liability
foreign taxes paid by its foreign subsidiaries out of their accumulated profits. In re
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 133 Vt. 132, 137, 335 A.2d 310, 313 (1975. The Supreme Court
noted that the gross-up figure was a fictitious amount useful only for federal income tax pur-
poses. Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4961-62; see H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A83
(1962) (discussing treatment of gross-up amount). New Mexico's effort to tax the amount of
the gross-up as income contravened the due process clause because the foreign tax credit in-
volved foreign subsidiaries that had no unitary business relationship with New Mexico.
Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4962. New Mexico contributed nothing for which it could tax the
gross-up. Id.
7' Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4959.
", Id. at 4960-61. The Court noted that the critical distinction between a retail mer-
chandising business as conducted by Woolworth and a vertically integrated oil company is
the centralized operation of the latter. See id. at 4961. Woolworth's international retail
operations failed to benefit from the flow of trade, interchange of personnel, or in-
terdependence of operating divisions as would a unitary business. Id. Woolworth maintained
its subsidiaries as investments and did not attempt to integrate, advise, or control them. Id.;
cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 440-41 (1980) (corporation failing
to operate subsidiaries for investment purposes held to operate unitary business).
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distinguished the organization of the business from an integrated
multinational corporation. 5 The Court recognized that Woolworth
received an economic benefit from ownership of the stock in the sub-
sidiaries, but emphasized that the underlying unity or diversity of
business enterprise determines inclusion within the unitary business."6
To determine the unitary or nonunitary character of Woolworth's
subsidiaries, the Court used the Mobil test and considered whether con-
tributions to the income of the subsidiaries or parent resulted from func-
tional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale." The Court found little functional integration of Woolworth and
its subsidiaries.78 The subsidiaries each made independent decisions
regarding merchandise, store site selection, advertising, accounting, and
financing.7" The parent and the subsidiaries did not engage in any cen-
tralized purchasing, manufacturing, or warehousing." Moreover, each
subsidiary's management operated relatively autonomously. 1 Full-time
management operated each subsidiary independently of the parent com-
pany, each subsidiary developed its own policies, and no rotation of per-
sonnel occurred.2 Finally, the Court found that neither Woolworth nor
any subsidiary benefitted from economies of scale.83
In ASARCO,8" ASARCO did not contest the fact that it operated an
integrated company which mined, smelted, refined, and sold various
nonferrous metals. 5 ASARCO, however, did contest the Idaho Tax Com-
' 50 U.S.L.W. at 4961; see supra note 74 (noting distinction between retail merchan-
dising business and vertically integrated oil business).
Is 50 U.S.L.W. at 4959. But see ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W.
4962, 4971 (U.S. June 29, 1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (parent corporation's ownership of
subsidiaries created business advantages to parent sufficient to establish unitary business);
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 166 (1911) (possession by corporation of investments
and other assets creates business advantage to corporation since credit, goodwill, and
prestige thereby are enhanced).
" Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4959; see supra text accompanying notes 57-58 (discus-
sion of Mobil test).
"' Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4959-60.
79 Id.
'OId.
, Id. The Woolworth Court noted that Woolworth and its subsidiaries shared several
common directors. Id. Frequent communications between the parent and the subsidiaries
took place. Id. Major financial decisions of the subsidiaries, including dividend amounts and
debt creation, needed Woolworth's approval. Id. Woolworth also included the subsidiaries in
the annual corporate reports on a consolidated basis. Id. The dissent argued that these fac-
tors indicated unitary operation of the business. Id. at 4969-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The majority countered that Woolworth's type of participation normally existed between
any parent corporation and its subsidiaries. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4961 (majority opinion).
Woolworth did not provide planning, financing, purchasing, accounting, or coordinating ser-
vices to its subsidiaries as did both Mobil and Exxon. Id.
See 50 U.S.L.W. at 4960.
' See id. at 4960-61 (economies of scale discussed).
" 50 U.S.L.W. at 4962 (U.S. June 29, 1982).
' Id. at 4962. ASARCO maintained its commercial domicile and headquarters in New
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mission's identification of five ASARCO subsidiaries as part of ASAR-
CO's unitary business.8 The Idaho Tax Commission asserted that cor-
porate purpose should govern what parts of a business are included
within a unitary business." Under Idaho's definition of a unitary
business if a parent corporation acquired, managed, or disposed of any
property for purposes relating or contributing to the parent's business,
the state could apportion the income generated by that property.8 The
Court rejected Idaho's assertion because Idaho's position would permit
states to apportion income from property when business activities of
out-of-state subsidiaries were independent of the activities of the parent
in the taxing state.89 Due process standards are inconsistent with a
definition of unitary business that emphasizes corporate purpose.
The Supreme Court concluded that no centralized management,
functional integration, or economies of scale existed between ASARCO
and its subsidiaries." Since ASARCO had minimal business relations92
York and incorporated under New Jersey law. Id. ASARCO's Idaho business consisted prin-
cipally of the operation of a silver mine. Id. Four foreign subsidiaries of ASARCO paid
ASARCO corporate dividends and interest on outstanding loans. Id. at 4963. ASARCO addi-
tionally realized a capital gain on the sale of stock of one of the subsidiaries. Id. The Idaho
State Tax Commission maintained that ASARCO's income from the dividends, interest, and
capital gain was business income and therefore was apportionable. Id. at 4964. The Idaho
Supreme Court agreed. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho
924, - , 592 P.2d 39, 52, affd sub nom. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102
Idaho 38, 624 P.2d 946 (1981) (per curiam), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962 (U.S. June 29, 1982).
" 50 U.S.L.W. at 4962. ASARCO did not contest the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling
that six of ASARCO's wholly owned subsidiaries were part of ASARCO's unitary business.
Id. at 4964. ASARCO contested the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling that five partially owned
subsidiaries were part of ASARCO's unitary business. Id. at 4964. ASARCO asserted that
the five subsidiaries were business enterprises distinct from ASARCO's operations in Idaho
and therefore the due process clause prohibited Idaho's effort to levy upon income not prop-
erly within its jurisdiction. Id. at 4966.
ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4963.
SSId.
89 Id. at 4967. The ASARCO Coprt stated that Idaho's proposed definition of a unitary
business was too broad. Id. Idaho asserted that integration of intangible assets into ASAR-
CO's business made the income from the intangible assets part of a unitary business. Id.
The Court rejected Idaho's definition of a unitary business because all corporate operations,
including any investments, are for purposes related tb or contributing to the corporation's
entire business. Id. When pressed to its logical limit, the Court concluded, Idaho's definition
of a unitary business becomes no limitation at all. Id.
0 Id. Due process standards prohibit nondomiciliary states from apportioning and tax-
ing intangible income when the business activities of the payor are independent from the ac-
tivities of the dividend recipient in the taxing state because no minimum relation exists be-
tween the income producer and the taxing state. Id.; see Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 344-45 (1954) (due process requires definite link between taxing state and person, prop-
erty, or transaction state seeks to tax); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940) (scope of state power to tax depends upon a rational relation between activity being
taxed and protection, opportunities, and benefits given by state).
See 50 U.S.L.W. at 4966-67.
See Keesling & Warren, supra note 23, at 50-57 (discussion of operational and
economic unit in unitary and nonunitary businesses).
1983l
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
with its subsidiaries, the subsidiaries represented mere investments
outside ASARCO's unitary business." The Court held that ASARCO
established that its subsidiaries were not part of ASARCO's unitary
business. 4 The Court focused on the fact that ASARCO failed to exer-
cise any control over its subsidiaries and overlooked the fact that the
subsidiary corporations operated businesses similar to ASARCO's
unitary business. 5 The Court reiterated its Woolworth position that
neither the potential to operate a unitary business nor actual economic
gain to the parent determined the unitary nature of the business. 6 The
majority refused to consider a corporation's economic advantage, profits
stability, or control potential gained by operation of several subsidiaries
in determining the extent of a unitary business and thereby refused to
expand the unitary business concept. 7 In dissent, Justice O'Connor con-
tended that the test of inclusion in a unitary business is the related
nature of a subsidiary's business or the business advantage the parent
receives from the relationship between parent and subsidiary.
The accepted test of inclusion in a unitary business as developed by
" 50 U.S.L.W. at 4966; see Square D Co. v. Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals, 415 S.W.2d
594, 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (unity of ownership does not itself create the required integra-
tion of business operations justifying taxing state in claiming a pro rata share of income of
out-of-state sources); People ex reL Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 N.Y. 114, 123, 155
N.E. 68, 71 (1926) (stock ownership not enough to bring parent corporation's income into
state for purpose of taxation of subsidiary corporation).
" 50 U.S.L.W. at 4968.
95Id. at 4966. The Court found that ASARCO maintained the potential to control its
subsidiaries, but did not exercise that control. Id. The Court refused to equate potential con-
trol over subsidiary operations with unitary operation of a corporation. Id.; American
Bakeries Co. v. Johnson, 259 N.C. 419, -, 131 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1963) (corporate separation
must be recognized despite similar or related business operations of several common con-
trolled corporations); Logan Clay Prods. Co. v. Commonwealth, 11 Pa. Commw. 629,
315 A.2d 346, 353-54 (1974) (same).
ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4966. The Woolworth decision recognized that the poten-
tial to operate a business in a unitary fashion does not dispose of the issue whether the cor-
poration operates as a unitary business. See Woolworth, at 4959.
1 50 U.S.L.W. at 4968 n. 24. Justice O'Connor argued that the majority ignored
business advantages accruing to ASARCO from operation of the subsidiaries in issue. Id. at
4972 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor additionally argued that ASARCO's
holdings in its subsidiaries represented part of its unitary business. Id.
" Id. at 4972. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that
ASARCO failed to prove that its subsidiaries earned income unrelated to ASARCO's
unitary operations. Id. at 4968-74. Justice O'Connor stated that ASARCO failed to
segregate its investment decision-making from its nonferrous metals business. Id. at 4969.
Justice O'Connor further pointed out that ASARCO failed to show that its stock holdings
were independent of the management of ASARCO's financial requirements. Id. at 4970.
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued that since ASARCO had the controlling position in each of
its subsidiaries, the investments actively contributed to ASARCO's unitary business. Id. at
4971. But see 50 U.S.L.W. 4968 n.24. The majority pointed out that the dissent considered
several factors in determining the unitary character of a business that the Court did not




the Court in Mobil, Exxon, Woolworth, and ASARCO is whether unity
and integration of management and company divisions exist and
whether economies of scale exist.9 The Mobil test focuses on whether
the business operations consist of a series of transactions or interrelated
departments substantially controlled by one corporation. °0 The Mobil
test utilizes two factors from a similar test adopted forty years ago by
the Supreme Court in Butler Brothers v. McColgan.1" The "three
unities" test that the Court used in Butler Brothers considered unity of
ownership, operation, and use to determine the extent of a unitary
business."' A corporation met the unity of ownership requirement if the
corporation retained ownership of a subsidiary's stock to transact fur-
ther business or if the stock was connected integrally with the business
of the owner."' Businesses found to operate in a unitary manner owned
substantially all of the stock of the subsidiary corporations."4 A cor-
porate group met the operation requirement if the business operated
with centralized administration, advertising, purchasing, and manage-
ment. ' Courts held that a unitary business fulfilled the use requirement
if the business integrated its use of executive forces and operational
" See ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4966-67; Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4959-61; Exxon,
447 U.S. at 222-25; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438-39.
10 Exxon, 447 U.S. at 222-25; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438-40.
"' See Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438 (citing Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508-09
(1942)).
"I See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1942). The Butler Brothers Court
adopted the three unities test to determine whether a business operated in a unitary man-
ner. Id. The determinative factors are unity of ownership, management and administrative
operations, and use of executive forces and operational systems. Id. Prior to the Butler
Brothers case, the Court realized the importance of unity of ownership and use in determin-
ing the existence of a unitary business. See Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490, 499 (1904) (taxation
by apportionment intended to reach intangible value created by use of property in taxing
state with use of commonly owned property outside taxing state); Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220-23, reh'g denied, 166 U.S. 185 (1897) (value of separate
articles of tangible property joined together in unity of ownership and use may develop into
greater intangible property value).
"9 Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 68 Cal. App. 2d 48, - , 156 P.2d 81, 99 (1945). See
generally Comment, Taxation of the Multistate Business: The Ownership Requirement of
the Unitary Concept, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 92 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Taxation of
Multistate Business].
"' See, e.g., Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 479-80, 183 P.2d 16, 22
(1947) (wholly owned subsidiary corporation held part of large unitary operation); Montana
Dep't of Revenue v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 173 Mont. 316, 328-29, 567 P.2d 901, 908
(1977) (same). But see J.G. McCrory Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. and Tax'n, 280 Mass. 273,
-, 182 N.E. 481, 482-483 (1932) (no basis to tax profits of nondomiciliary parent corpora-
tion, though wholly owned subsidiary in taxing state operated at loss).
"' Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 417, -, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552, ,
386 P.2d 40, 41-43 (1963) (unity of operations defined as centralized production, operations,
purchasing, fiscal and sales policies, and financial and legal services); Superior Oil Co. v. Fran-
chise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 412, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548-49, 386 P.2d 33, 36-37 (1963) (unity of
operations defined as centralized coordination of exploration, well production, technical
development, drilling operations, and legal activities).
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systems."6 In rare circumstances courts disregarded the unity of opera-
tions requirement and stressed the actual control of the parent corpora-
tion over the operations of its subsidiary. ' In general, the basis of finding
a unitary business under the three unities test depended upon finding
substantial contributions and dependence between the parent and its sub-
sidiaries."°8
Critics of the three unities test have contended that the unity con-
cept is ambiguous and of little assistance in determining the extent of a
unitary business.' 9 Some courts have utilized a "mutual benefit" test in
order to determine the extent of a unitary business."' The mutual
benefit test examines whether a number of business operations having
common ownership mutually benefit one another and whether each
operation depends upon or contributes to the other operations."' The
test focuses upon the organization of operating and administrative
departments,"2 coordination and standardization of activities,"' and in-
tegration of corporate income. ' 4 The mutual benefit test is similar to the
three unities test in that the mutual benefit test also emphasizes finding a
"0 See Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 34 Cal. Rptr. 552, -, 386 P.2d 40, 43
(1963) (unity of use resulting in economies of scale defined as integrated use of executive
forces and operational systems); Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 478-80,
183 P.2d 16, 20-21 (1947) (same).
1.. See Appeal of F.W. Woolworth Co., CAL. TAx. RPTR. (CCH) 204-806 (July 31, 1972)
(unity of operations requirement in test for unitary business unnecessary if parent corpora-
tion controls subsidiary through management decisions at highest level); Chase Brass &
Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 504-06, 95 Cal. Rptr. 805, 808-09
(same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 961 (1970).
,os See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942) (test based on contributory ac-
tivities); Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 412-13, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549,
386 P.2d 33, 38 (1963) (same).
,"9 See Coca Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, 271 Or. 517, 524 n.2, 533 P.2d 788, 792
n.2 (1975) (criticism of three unities test); Keesling & Warren, supra note 23, at 47 (three
unities test ambiguous and of little value).
"'l See, Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, 355-56, 71
N.W.2d 797, 805 (1955) (adopting mutual benefit test for unitary business); Zale-Salem, Inc.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 237 Or. 261, 265, 391 P.2d 601, 602 (1964) (same).
. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, 355-56, 71
N.W.2d 797, 805 (1955) (holding mutually beneficial corporate activities conducted in several
states one unitary business).
"' See Zale-Salem, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 237 Or. 261, -, 392 P.2d 601, 601-02,
(1964) (technically separate corporations mutually benefitted one another through organiza-
tion of various departments).
. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, - , 71
N.W.2d 797, 804-05 (1955) (corporate operations in different states mutually beneficial due to
coordination of activities).
' See Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 272 Minn. 403, __ , 138
N.W.2d 612, 616-17 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 718 (1966) (integration of corporate in-
come mutually benefitted separate business activities of corporation).
,' See supra text accompanying notes 108, 110-14 (mutual benefit test for unitary




contributory and dependent relationship between parent and subsidiary
corporations operating in a unitary business.'
Mobil, Exxon, Woolworth, and ASARCO represent the Supreme
Court's view that state apportionment of unitary business income is
desirable."" In Mobil, the Court recognized that unitary apportionment
counters abusive income allocations by unitary businesses in intercor-
porate transactions."' Affiliated corporations often gain tax advantages,
to the disadvantage of certain states, through the use of intercompany
transactions."8 Related companies can allocate income to operating divi-
sions or subsidiary corporations in favorable taxing states or
countries."' Intercompany transactions free from market restraints may
emphasize tax purposes over business purposes in the form of interest
free loans,"' price fixing,"' rent-free use of equipment and technology,"
manipulated dividends," and other forms of income shifting. Unitary ap-
"' See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980) (linchpin
of apportionability in field of state income taxation is unitary business principle); ALTMAN &
KEESLING, supra note 18, at 161-64; Dexter, supra note 19, at 183. See also Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 460 (1959) (purpose of apportion-
ment is taxation of multistate and multinational corporate taxpayers in proportion to tax-
payer's intrasate corporate activities).
, ' See Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438-39 (citing Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113
(1920).
"' See Dow Chem. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 378 Mass. 254, - , 391 N.E.2d
253, 257 (1979) (tax avoidance aided by "non-arm's-length" arrangements between parent
and subsidiary companies regarding intercompany pricing, transfer of patent rights, inter-
company management fees, and similar practices).
119 See Corning Glass Works v. Department of Revenue, 616 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981) (corporation may avoid or limit state taxation by shifting income to operations in
states with low tax rates).
1" See Tollefsen v. Commissioner, 431 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1970) (cash withdrawals
made by parent corporation from wholly owned inactive subsidiary in form of loans held not
loans, but rather taxable dividend income); Aristar, Inc. v. United States, 553 F.2d 644,
646-47 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (allocating additional interest income to holding company which made
interest free loans to subsidiaries in order to reduce taxes of controlled enterprise). See
generally Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
207, 222-28 (1956).
"' See Wisconsin Big Boy Corp. v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 137, 140 (7th Cir. 1971) (fee
structure used by parent corporation permitted splitting of income between several sub-
sidiary corporations in order to obtain tax advantages); Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 79 F.2d 234, 236 (2nd Cir. 1935) (holding non-arm's-length intersubsidiary transfers of
property sham transaction in attempt to avoid taxes). See generally H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1921) (noting companies frequently use foreign subsidiaries to shift in-
come to avoid taxes).
11 See Cooper v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 576, 581 (1975) (material distortion in sole
shareholder's income resulted when corporation used assets belonging to shareholder
without having paid rent); cf. Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 631, 636-38 (9th
'Cir. 1972) (excessive rental agreement between two closely affiliated corporations did not
reflect actual value of lease, but served to aid lessor's income needs).
"1 See Northwest Nat'l Bank v. United States, 556 F.2d 889, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1977) (pur-
pose behind dividend distribution was to obtain tax advantage unavailable in arm's-length
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portionment of corporate income attributes income to taxing states
regardless of any income shifting that might take place."4 Unitary appor-
tionment, therefore, counters abusive corporate allocations.",
The Supreme Court allows state legislatures great latitude in the
choice and application of apportionment statutes."6 Federal legislation,
prescribing the methods by which states can tax foreign operations of
nondomiciliary corporations, presently is pending in both houses of Con-
gress." The bills, which are very similar, would limit the income of
multinational corporations subject to state taxation and define the man-
ner in which states may tax multinational income." Both bills generally
would prohibit states from apportioning the income of any related
foreign corporation through the unitary business method." These bills
would exempt from state taxation most dividends received by parent
corporations from foreign subsidiaries and affiliates."' Industry
representatives favor the bills and states' rights spokesmen oppose the
legislation."' Application of the unitary business principle itself remains
transaction, consequently distorting respective net incomes of both parent and subsidiary
corporations). Dividends represent a vehicle by which a parent corporation can move assets
from a subsidiary to itself in order to gain various tax advantages. Id. See generally
Eustice, Tax Problems Arising from Transactions Between Affiliated or Controlled Cor-
porations, 23 TAx L. REv. 451, 481-523 (1968).
124 See Taxation of Multistate Business, supra note 103, at 96-99 (illustrative example
of abusive intracompany accounting and application of apportionment as solution); cf.
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Tax'n, 245 Minn. 346, -, 71 N.W.2d 797,
806 (1955) (separate accounting inherently incapable of accurately attributing income of
unitary business because separate accounting rests in part on estimates and often resorts to
arbitrary allocations).
" Corning Glass Works v. Department of Revenue, 616 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979). Apportionment inhibits a multistate business from shifting losses for a tax advantage
by attributing income to the taxing state in proportion to the business' intrastate activity.
Id. Transactions between related corporate taxpayers that are not at arm's length
necessitate unitary apportionment in order accurately to reflect income attributable to the
states in which the business operates. See TAx FOUNDATION SEMINAR, supra note 36, at 50.
Comment, State Taxation of Commerce, 8 J. CORP. TAX*N 3, 10 (1982).
12 See S. 655, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as S. 6551; H.R. 1983, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1983].
12 S. 655, supra note 126, § 7518(a); H.R. 1983, supra note 126, § 7518(a).
2 S. 655, supra note 126, § 7518(a); H.R. 1983, supra note 126, § 7518(a).
1 S. 655, supra note 126, § 7518(e); H.R. 1983, supra note 126, § 7518(e).
3 See generally State Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Hearings on H.R. 5076
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings], State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Cor-
porate Income: Hearing on S.983 and S.1688 Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n and Debt
Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Industry representatives generally support S. 655
and H.R. 1983, and states' rights spokesmen generally disfavor the bills: Comprare House
Hearings, supra, at 192 (statement of Dallas A. Hurston, Assistant Director of Taxes for
Coca-Cola), and Senate Hearings, supra, at 99-100 (statement of John S. Nolan on behalf of
the British National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce) with House
Hearings, supra, at 18 (statement of Bryon Dorgan, Past Chairman, Multistate Tax Commis-
sion), and Senate Hearings, supra, at 362 (statement of Sen. Church). These hearings refer
[Vol 40:191
NONDOMICILIAR Y CORPORATIONS
the central issue.32 To date, neither bill has left committee. 13
The critics of the pending legislation, and unitary apportionment
generally, cite two problems with apportionment. First, states
sometimes apply apportionment formulas in arbitrary and unreasonable
ways. 134 Second, states often apportion unitary income without regard to
the possibility of duplicative taxation." 5 Supporters of unitary apportion-
ment admit that states possess great freedom in applying their in-
dividual formulas, but note that courts readily strike down taxing for-
mulas that exceed constitutional limits. 38 Moreover, recent case law
demonstrates that the threat of double taxation is minimal."3 Neither
Mobil nor Exxon could prove that double taxation actually existed. Con-
sequently, the Court held that the corporations' arguments were too
speculative."
to H.R. 5076 and S. 1688, rather than H.R. 1983 and S. 655. The latter bills retained identical
language of the former bills with several minor changes. Compare S. 655, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) (clarifying the extent to which a state or other political subdivision may tax cer-
tain income from sources outside the United States), and H.R. 1983, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) (same) with S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (same) and H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1979) (same). One subsection appears in both S. 655 and H.R. 1983 which did not ap-
pear in S. 1688 or H.R. 5076. See S. 655, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7518(e)3 (1981) (special rule
with respect to dividends from domestic corporations treated as foreign corporations); H.R.
1983, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7518(e)3 (1981) (same).
'" See Senate Hearings, supra note 131, at 40 (prepared statement of Donald C.
Lubick, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy). Spokesmen in favor of S. 1688
generally oppose the unitary method of apportionment as the Supreme Court has developed
the concept. Id. States' rights spokesmen oppose the legislation because the legislation pro-
poses a reduced tax base for state income taxation. See id. at 371 (statement of Benjamin F.
Miller, California Franchise Tax Board).
13 The Senate bill remains in the Senate Finance Committee. [1982] 1 CONG. INDEX
(CCH) 14,175. The House bill remains in the House Ways and Means Committee. [1982] 2
CONG. INDEX (CCH) 28,251.
"3 See id. at 172 (prepared statement of Earnest S. Christian, Jr., Council to the Com-
mittee on State Taxation). International business representatives agree with Justice
Stevens' Mobil dissent, stating that apportionment formulas often result in inconsistent
evaluations of the taxpayer's tax liability. See id. at 100 (statement of John S. Nolan on
behalf of the British National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce); id. at
53 (prepared statement of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax
Policy). See also Comment, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Sec-
tion 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1202, 1228-29 (1976) (criticism of
formulary apportionment).
1 See Senate Hearings, supra note 131, at 98 (statement of John S. Nolan on behalf of
the British National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce); id. at 181
(prepared statement of Earnest S. Christian, Jr., Counsel to the Committee on State Taxa-
tion). But see ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 18, at 14-15. The duplicative taxation prob-
lem might arise because of the fine line between double taxation and tax avoidance. Id. A
credit allowance may be a solution against the overpaid tax figure. Id.
,'3 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325-26
(1968) (state tax apportionment held invalid because income attributed to taxing state dis-
proportionate to business transacted in the taxing state by corporation); Hans Rees' Sons,
Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931) (same).
'= See Exxon, 447 U.S. at 228; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 444-45.
' See Exxon, 447 U.S. at 228; Mobil, 445 U.S. at 444-45.
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Until either Congress enacts legislation in the area of state taxation
of multistate and multinational corporations or all fifty states adopt
UDITPA,"' corporations must follow individual state statutes and court
decisions regarding taxation of corporate income. The Supreme Court
has focused upon the economic and managerial relationship between
parent and affiliates in order to determine what to include in a corpora-
tion's unitary business. " ' The Court rejected the notion that amount of
investment or type of investment compels inclusion of income in a cor-
poration's tax base."'
Recent Supreme Court decisions guide corporations facing the
potential problem of overtaxation at the state level.' Several alter-
natives and administrative remedies exist for corporations desiring to
show the nonapplicability of unitary apportionment in specific
instances.' First, the corporation can demonstrate the nonunitary
status of the income in question.' Second, the corporation may be able
to prove actual double taxation of the income in question. "' Third, the
corporation can demonstrate the lack of fiscal relationship between the
state and the income in question. " 6 Fourth, the corporation can apply
directly to the state revenue department on a case-by-case basis for
relief from an unreasonable apportionment statute."7 Finally, the cor-
poration can form an investment subsidiary in a hospitable state for the
purpose of receiving dividends." 8
Cases and commentators have demonstrated that some method of
129 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussion of UDITPA). A recent
survey indicates that thirty-nine states have adopted UDITPA or similar legislation. State
of Indiana, SURVEY ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE TAX LAWS, p. 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SURVEY].
"' See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962, 4965 (U.S. June 29,
1982; F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957, 4959-61 (U.S.
June 29, 1982; Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 224 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980); supra notes 25, 40-44, 53-61 & 102
and accompanying text (discussion of factors held indicative of unitary business).
"' Mobil, 445 U.S. at 438.
142 See, e.g., ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4962; Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4957.
"I See infra text accompanying notes 144-148.
... See ASARCO, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4968 (income earned outside of unitary operations not
apportionable); Woolworth, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4961 (same).
"I See Exxon, 447 U.S. at 228. The Exxon Court suggested that actual double taxation
of corporate income violates the commerce clause. Id. (dictum).
146 See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954) (lack of minimum con-
nection between taxing state and transaction sought to be taxed violates commerce clause).
... See UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 18, 7A U.L.A. 89 (1978).
Section 18 provides that corporations may contest directly the accuracy of the state appor-
tionment statute as the statute applies to the particular corporation. Id.
'" See Krol, Minimizing State Taxes with "Receipts Factor" Planning, Investment
Subsidiaries, 52 J. TAX'N, 362, 366 (1980). Formation of an investment subsidiary in a
hospitable state might eliminate the possibility of double taxation by the commercial




unitary apportionment is preferable to separate accounting or specific
allocation when the corporate taxpayer conducts business in more than
one tax jurisdiction. "9 Apportionment serves to counter abusive income
shifting by a corporation trying to avoid or to evade taxes. ' The Mobil
test reasonably determines the extent of a unitary business and
represents over sixty years of development by the Supreme Court and
several state courts. 5' The biggest problem in the area of state appor-
tionment is finding a formula that produces accurate tax results,
preventing both undertaxation and overtaxation."' Cooperation among
the states in the form of mutual tax credits'53 or taxation by combined
reporting'TM will compensate for individual state formula inaccuracies.
Alternatively, federal regulation of the amount of income included in the
tax base of a unitary business and of state taxation formulas will assure
reasonable state taxation of corporations. '55 In the absence of congres-
sional legislation or cooperation among income taxing states, however,
corporate taxpayers, state courts, and state tax administrators will con-
tinue to depend upon the Supreme Court decisions in Mobil, Exxon,
Woolworth, and ASARCO for guidance in the taxation of multistate and
multinational corporations.
DAVID KEITH FRIEDFELD
"9 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,438-39 (1980); North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959); Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 280, 282 (1924); ALTMAN & KEESLING,
supra note 18, at 29, 38, 100; Dexter, supra note 19, at 181-83; Keesling & Warren, supra
note 23, at 43-45; cf. Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, -, 183 P.2d 16,
21 (1947) (separate accounting cannot accurately determine income of various parts of
unitary business); Webb Resources, Inc. v. McCoy, 194 Kan. 758, -, 401 P.2d 879, 886
(1965) (specific allocation cannot be used to determine income of various parts of unitary
business).
"5 See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
Il, See supra notes 37-44 & 57-63 and accompanying text.
"' See ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 18, at 14.
" See ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 18, at 15. Many states presently allow credit
against use tax liability for sales tax due and paid in other states. See SURVEY, supra note
138, at 3, 23-25.
1 See Montana Dep't of Revenue v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 173 Mont. 316,
567 P.2d 901, 908 (1977) (combined reporting obvious extension of unitary apportion-
ment); Coca Cola Co. v. Department of Revenue, 271 Or. 517, -, 533 P.2d 788, 793 (1975)
(same). Combined apportionment includes income of all subsidiaries and affiliates of the tax-
payer and eliminates all intercorporate transfers, such as dividend income, from the calcula-
tion. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 441 n.15. Moreover, the combined apportionment formula includes
the subsidiaries' and affiliates' sales, payroll, and property in the calculation which generally
results in a smaller apportionment fraction. Id. See generally Coca Cola Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 271 Or. 517, - 533 P.2d 788, 790-93 (1975) (discussion of combined apportion-
ment).
"' See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
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